Non-originalist Arbitration - 1979 constitutional interpretation by proposing non-originalist adjudication, a method that “grants the original text and history of the Constitution presumptive weight, but does not regard them as authoritative or binding” (p. 70). This method directly conflicts with originalism, the method of interpretation supported by Antonin Scalia, but generally accords with semantic intentionalism, the approach proposed by Ronald Dworkin. The difference in the outcome of a non-originalist interpretation is particularly visible in cases involving morality and equality, for example if applied hypothetically to the 1971 Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade. Comparing different approaches to constitutional interpretation and examining the supposed legal outcome of a non-originalist judgment leads us to realize that a method that allows the law to deviate so far from the Constitution is truly dangerous for our traditional conception of government and threatens the stability of our constitutional system. Non-originalism, originalism, and semantic intentionalism Non-originalism and originalism, the approaches to constitutional interpretation proposed by Paul Brest and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia contrast as much in philosophy as in name; non-originalism allows the interpreter to deviate from the scope of the Constitution in the name of social progress, while originalism keeps the interpreter within the bounds of the text, in order to preserve traditional values. To begin with, Scalia's originalist understanding...... middle of paper ...... institution enabled by non-originalism. These problems may go unnoticed or at least unresolved, seemingly inconsequential, until one day we may be shocked to realize that our Constitution and traditional system of government have been trampled under the enormous weight of many neglected intrusions. by a non-originalist interpretation. References Dworkin, R. (1996). The law of liberty: the moral reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. Madison, J. (1788). Federalist No. 51: “The structure of government must provide appropriate checks and balances among the various departments. » New York Packet. Paul Brest, The erroneous quest for original understanding 60 BUL REV. 204 (1980) Scalia, A. and Gutmann, A. (2001). A Question of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Essay / Non-originalist Arbitration - 1979 constitutional interpretation by proposing non-originalist adjudication, a method that “grants the original text and history of the Constitution presumptive weight, but does not regard them as authoritative or binding” (p. 70). This method directly conflicts with originalism, the method of interpretation supported by Antonin Scalia, but generally accords with semantic intentionalism, the approach proposed by Ronald Dworkin. The difference in the outcome of a non-originalist interpretation is particularly visible in cases involving morality and equality, for example if applied hypothetically to the 1971 Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade. Comparing different approaches to constitutional interpretation and examining the supposed legal outcome of a non-originalist judgment leads us to realize that a method that allows the law to deviate so far from the Constitution is truly dangerous for our traditional conception of government and threatens the stability of our constitutional system. Non-originalism, originalism, and semantic intentionalism Non-originalism and originalism, the approaches to constitutional interpretation proposed by Paul Brest and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia contrast as much in philosophy as in name; non-originalism allows the interpreter to deviate from the scope of the Constitution in the name of social progress, while originalism keeps the interpreter within the bounds of the text, in order to preserve traditional values. To begin with, Scalia's originalist understanding...... middle of paper ...... institution enabled by non-originalism. These problems may go unnoticed or at least unresolved, seemingly inconsequential, until one day we may be shocked to realize that our Constitution and traditional system of government have been trampled under the enormous weight of many neglected intrusions. by a non-originalist interpretation. References Dworkin, R. (1996). The law of liberty: the moral reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. Madison, J. (1788). Federalist No. 51: “The structure of government must provide appropriate checks and balances among the various departments. » New York Packet. Paul Brest, The erroneous quest for original understanding 60 BUL REV. 204 (1980) Scalia, A. and Gutmann, A. (2001). A Question of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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