The primary role of the military is the protection of territorial sovereignty. This does not prevent it from participating in operations other than war to strengthen total national defense. The employment of infantry battalions of the Guyana Defense Force in civil protection operations has been seen over the years as an effective strategy, since one of its 3 roles is to "assist the civil authorities in maintaining of public order” (Defense). Act, chapter 1501, 1977). This broad role acts as a catalyst that makes the Force a stabilizing element within Guyanese society. As such, the GDF has historically been used as a response mechanism to natural disasters, due to its pool of readily available human and other resources. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned"? Get the original essay On the morning of January 17, 2005, residents of Regions 3, 4, and 5 rose up in response to what was described as “the worst natural disaster in the country”. (GINA, 2015). “The floods affected approximately 290,000 people (39% of Guyana's population) (Guyana Flood 2005, 2005). More than “100 officers and ranks” (George, 2018) were deployed along the lower east coast and in the regions to assist several government and non-government organizations. More recently, the ranks of Camp Kanuku, in Lethem, participated in the fight against floods in Region 9 (Stabroek News, 2018). The Force's involvement in civil protection operations is not limited to observed cases. In both cases, the Force has proven itself to be a willing and managed human resource provider in an organized manner, to assist the government in providing essential supplies and emergency services. However, this document claims that GDF infantry battalions, the operational units of the Force, are ill-prepared to deal with national disasters in their area of ​​operations because they do not have the required training and equipment. to facilitate their effective use in civil defense operations. In order to dichotomize the hypotheses of this thesis, an analysis of the threat in the Areas of Operations, the capacity in terms of equipment and training of the mentioned Units will be undertaken with a view to providing recommendations to resolve the inadequacies of the Units. To this end, the discourse on the subject treated will come from questionnaires (Appendix 1) and the review of the literature on this subject. Therefore, civil defense will be defined as “the system of protective measures and emergency relief activities carried out by civilians in the event of hostile attack, sabotage or natural disaster” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2018) . Employment will also be defined as “the use of” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2018). This essay also assumes that the role of the Civil Defense Commission (CDC) (Guyana) is “to develop plans and carry out actions”. operations to deal with all types of disasters in Guyana” (CDC, 2018). Conversely, the role of the GDF infantry battalions allows its involvement in civil protection operations; which are operations outside of its war functions. This essay further recognizes that responding to civil protection is a role specific to the Guyana People's Militia (GPM) (Granger, 2008) of which the 2nd Infantry Battalion is a part. On the other hand, the dispersal of the 1st and 6th Infantry Battalions among Guyana's communities, coupled with its experience in dealing with natural disasters, suggests that it is imperative that officers and ranks continue to play acentral role in civil protection. However, this will require infantry battalions to have the necessary equipment, as well as improving and providing more training opportunities for officers and ranks to be trained and exercised in the disaster management. Global warming has caused constant changes in weather conditions. models around the world. This has important consequences for coastal populations, particularly those located below sea level, as in the case of Guyana, located on the Caribbean coast of South America between latitudes 1° and 9°N and longitudes 56° and 62°W. The coastal parts of Guyana lie between 19.7 inches (0.5 meters) and 39.4 inches (1 meter) below sea level” (Bureau of Statistics, 2002). Its narrow, fertile marshy plain along the Atlantic coast (low coastal plain - Appendix 2) is home to over 85% of its population and is constantly inundated by floodwaters. Guyana has also been identified as a “high risk country due to the effects of coastal, riverine and rainfall flooding, as well as the likely emerging and future consequences of climate change”. (US EPA, 2015). Flooding is the main disaster caused by land-based flooding in the East Demerara Conservancy, which in turn causes flooding of the Mahaica River and surrounding canals, as shown in Annex 3. This is usually caused by excessive runoff caused by heavy rains. . Second, maritime flooding, or coastal flooding, caused by storm surges, often exacerbated by storm runoff from the upper catchment and overflow from the Atlantic Ocean along the east coast of Demerara during the periods of high tides and spring waters. The above reveals the very dangerous position that Georgetown and its surrounding communities find themselves in, confined between vast bodies of water. This contributes to flooding which mainly affects regions 2, 3, 4 and 5. “Continued heavy rains in region 9 and the state of Roraima in Brazil have caused the Rio Branco, Ireng and Takutu rivers to overflow, resulting in caused serious flooding in Lethem. its surroundings and other low-lying areas of Region 9”, (Office of Climate Change, 2018), as shown in Annex 4. The GDF infantry battalions are located as shown in Annex 5. The 1st Infantry Battalion has its headquarters at base camp. Stephenson and locations at Camp Jaguar, New River, Eteringbang, Cuyuni River, Makapa, Cuyuni River, Yarrow, Wenamu River and Kaikan. The 2 Infantry Bn has its headquarters at Seweyo, Linden Soesdyke Highway and locations at Camp Kanuku, Lethem and Camp Groomes, Linden Soesdyke Highway. Finally, the 6th Infantry Battalion has its headquarters at Anna Regina and locations at Camp Everard and Patro Base, White Water, Mabaruma and New Amsterdam and Benab. “Training continues to be the Force's most important peacetime activity, and it always will be. be the vital element of any military institution. This is the cornerstone of our preparation; therefore, if it is poorly targeted or poorly conducted, it will be ineffective and the Force will be incapable of fulfilling its role” (Lovell, 2010). Training is further defined as “teaching a person a particular skill or type of behavior through regular practice and instruction” (Oxford, 2009). It is in this context that a generic collection of courses has been developed by the Force to which all units subscribe each year. These courses are delivered by Training Corps, STAIN and All Arms, through the “twojoint military programs; one for junior officers/SNCOs and the other for junior noncommissioned officers/other ranks” (Force Training Doctrine, 2010). This is listed in Annex 4. Training is also delivered at external academic institutions such as the University of Guyana, technical institutes, as well as with government and international partners in other disciplines. Also looking at force training doctrine, civil defense was only mentioned twice in the entire document, in the same paragraph, as it specifically spoke about "training of reserves of other ranks will encompass both areas related to infantry skills and civil defense and community response techniques, such as firefighting. This aims to give it the skills required to augment the Regular Force and ensure civil protection and essential services in the community. (Force Training Doctrine, 2010). “The units of the Force must always be in a high state of readiness for operational action and therefore the interspersion of individual training with collective training must be planned. (Force Training Doctrine, 2010). A review of the annual reports for 2017 of the 1st, 2nd and 6th Infantry Battalions revealed that, in total, "4 officers and 152 ORs" (1st Infantry Battalion, 2017) were trained on the All Arms courses and STAIN. , “a total of 8 ORs have been approved for academic and technical training” (1 Infantry Bn, 2017). In addition to this training, in addition to trained ranks above, one officer was permitted to participate in training in Barbados within the Caribbean Disaster Relief Unit. This represents less than 1% of the number of battalions trained in civil defense operations. The training regime of the 2 Infantry Battalion provided that 3 officers and 51 ORs were trained through various courses in 2017 (2 Infantry Battalion, 2017). That is, 1 officer was trained overseas, 2 completed the platoon commander course, and 47 of the 51 ORs completed the all-arms and STAIN courses. The remaining 4 ORs were trained at external academic institutions (2 Infantry Bn, 2017). That is to say that 20.5% of the Unit's staff were trained. In the final analysis, the training of the 6th Infantry Battalion was no different from that of the other two battalions. A total of 3 officers and 83 ranks were trained through the All Arms and STAIN courses. 1 Offr and 11 others were trained in academic institutions. This represents 42.7% of the Unit's personnel trained. No training was provided in direct relation to civil defense to the 2nd and 6th infantry battalions. Analyzing the previous discourse on the infantry battalions, that is, the 1, 2 and 6th Infantry Battalions of the Guyana Defense, there appears to be a commonality in the formation. at the lower level, i.e. during All Arms and STAIN classes. Grades can subscribe to a variety of courses ranging from office, engineering, promotion and even courses at external institutions. However, training for a role within civil protection operations was not taken into account in any of these courses delivered last year. In fact, civil protection was not programmed within the training programs of these courses. (Training Corps, 2017). Furthermore, it was also revealed that no significant civil defense training was provided to equip the ranks for such eventualities during the reporting period, while the ranks were involved in disaster relief. flooding in Region 9 last year (Mendonca, 2018). At the higher level, that is to say theofficers and senior non-commissioned officers, a similar situation occurred as minimal training was provided in this regard. No training in civil protection was offered to either the officer or the senior non-commissioned officers as part of the courses taken internally or in external university establishments. A total of 11 officers and 297 ORs were trained within the battalions, representing 41.5% of the total strength of the combined battalions, of which only one person was trained in civil protection. the Force is based on common programs at junior and senior levels, which synergizes Forces doctrine across all units. Added to this is the breadth of training received which covers areas from office work to more technical subjects such as first aid at junior levels. At officer level, training is not limited, although there are some key areas of training. Therefore, officers and ranks of the 1st, 2nd and 6th Infantry Battalions learned the same doctrine and had the same training opportunities. However, there appears to be an inherent weakness in the training of these units, in that training for a role in civil protection is minimal despite the frequent involvement of these units in flood relief, for example. Training is also heavily oriented towards warfare, where open country warfare is used as a basis for teaching other doctrines. This is despite Guyana’s reliance on “international diplomacy as a means of resolving conflicts with its neighbors” (Granger, 2018). Nevertheless, training opportunities are offered through continued policy know-how and international partnership. There is an urgent need for the Force to collaborate with organizations such as the CDC to better develop its effectiveness in responding to floods through specialist training and an understanding of the dynamics of civil protection operations. This relationship offers endless possibilities, for example training platoon and company commanders as shelter managers, and training operational personnel as emergency center managers. Ultimately, however, the Force must develop a doctrine that includes techniques, tactics and procedures specific to its participation in civil protection. This is lacking and can be seen as a threat to the Force's continued participation in civil protection operations. Infantry battalions have limited equipment that can be used in the event of a disaster in their areas of operations. Analysis of the asset register of these units for 2017 suggests that the 1st Infantry Battalion has boats (2 x boats at Eteringbang and 1 x boat at New River). There was no boat in the stores, but there was an outboard motor. (1 Infantry Bn, 2017). They also had the largest number of vehicles (2 trucks and 4 vans) at headquarters and 1 ATV at New River and Eteringbang respectively. The store's 2 water pumps were out of order and the other 3 were in use in different locations. (Peters, 2018). There were also 20 camp beds, 8 of which were broken, and 15 rechargeable lamps, 10 of which were broken. This summarizes the state of the equipment of the 1st Infantry Battalion. In the 2nd Infantry Battalion, there were respectively 2 vans at headquarters and 1 vehicle and 1 boat in Lethem (2nd Infantry, 2018). The 6th Infantry Battalion was also limited in its equipment capacity to deal with civil defense operations. There were 2 vans at headquarters, 1 van and an ATV in Mabaruma and 1 van in New Amsterdam respectively. At headquarters there was also 1x generator. This unit.