There is no doubt that sports agency has grown exponentially over the past two decades (Neiman, 2007). Player agents have become an increasingly important figure in negotiating and negotiating athlete contracts in professional sports (Neiman, 2007). (Steinberg, 1991) also states that agents not only help athletes with contract negotiations, but also support them “in their transition to adulthood.” Athlete agents are tasked with the difficult task of maximizing their clients' economic returns throughout their clients' short careers in the spotlight (Staudohar & Mangan, 1991). Unfortunately, today, professional athletes are viewed as an opportunity by agents to earn substantial sums of money through publicity of their image and style (Staudohar & Mangan, 1991). This led to dishonest agents not working in the best interests of the athletes themselves and caused much controversy within the media and public (Crandall, 1981). Despite their necessity, player agents have received much miraculous criticism due to the impact they have on professional athletes and professional sports as a whole (Steinberg, 1991). The purpose of this essay is to delve into the role of player agents in professional sports in much greater detail. Key areas such as the history, roles and responsibilities of player agents will be covered, as well as the player-athlete relationship and sports agent feedback. Next, the trial will evaluate the impact of player agents on specific amateur sports such as college football and non-professional Olympic sports and determine whether they have a role to play, as they already do in professional sports. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay In previous decades, negotiations took place directly between sports franchises and athletes' franchises (Neiman, 2007). Having left school early to pursue a sporting career, negotiations were not an athlete's strength, having failed to acquire the sufficient skills needed (Mason, 1997). This allowed sports franchises to take advantage of athletes' lack of knowledge and negotiation skills (Mason, 1997). As a result, the Major League Baseball Players Association negotiated with Major League Baseball in the 1970s for athletes to have the right to have an associate assist them in consultations with a club (Neiman, 2007). This allowed athletes to maximize their salaries and solidify their bargaining position through their agent's experienced and skillful negotiations (Neiman, 2007). Many athletes still strongly oppose the idea of ​​having a third-party representative, choosing to negotiate for themselves (Crandall, 1981). Although the help of an agent can be of great help and benefit to athletes (Crandall, 1981). Originally, the primary role of player agents was solely to manage players' contracts with professional sports teams (Mason & Slack, 2005). However, as money has become an increasing factor in sport, so have the impact, roles, and responsibilities of player agents (Heitner & Saul, 2013). In addition to handling player contracts, agents now handle sponsorship deals, marketing contracts, trust funds, tax advice, retirement planning and many otherskey areas, ensuring that athletes take full advantage of their public image (Mason and Slack, 2005). . This development led to an increase in scandals as agents became more involved in the lives of their athletes, allowing them to abuse their power and act in the best interests of themselves rather than those of the athlete (Heitner & Saul, 2013)( Crandall, 1981). Along with the rise of agent representation in sports, agent-athlete relationships have become almost as important as an athlete's relationship with their team itself (Crandall, 1981). Agency falls under common law and the agent is therefore subject to it when entering into a relationship with an athlete (Neiman, 2007). Agents and athletes have a fiduciary relationship, meaning that agents must demonstrate honesty, loyalty, and good faith toward their athlete while acting altruistically for the benefit of the athlete (Champion, 1996) . When discussing an athlete's contracts, an agent must always keep the athlete's best interests in mind (Hynes, 1997). A fiduciary relationship is above all an alliance based on trust, because it is an uncertain relationship whose results are often vague and ambiguous (Hynes, 1997). (Champion 1996) states that the standard agency contract is the main key to a player-agent relationship because it highlights the rights and responsibilities between the player and the agent. The contract states that the agent must make a good faith effort on behalf of the athlete when negotiating, even if it is not always successful (Champion, 1996). The contract also states that the agent must avoid conflicts of interest when interviewing on behalf of the athlete (Champion, 1996). Although agents can perform many functions for an athlete, their primary purpose is to negotiate an athlete's employment contract with a team (Neiman, 2007). In doing so, the agent must reveal all necessary information to the athlete about the contract offered by the club and must also know the collective agreement of the league in which the athlete will work (Neiman, 2007). The agent must also be informed of all relevant information about the athlete himself during the negotiation in order to secure the highest possible salary for his athlete for the longest period of time (Neiman, 2007). A case that defines a breakdown of this type of relationship is the Detroit Lions, Inc. V. Argowitz (Ring, 1987). In this case, Detroit Lions player Bill Sims was misrepresented and caught in a cycle of conflicts of interest (Ring, 1987). His agent Jerry Argovitz advised Sims to join the USFL team, the Houston Gamblers (Ring, 1987). Argowitz failed to mention to his client that he was a co-owner of the Houston Gamblers at the time and attempted to continue acting as Sims' agent (Ring, 1987). This was an example of fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty by the agent that resulted in the cancellation of Sims' second contract (Champion, 1996). The court said that even though the player had an interest in that USFL team, the agent failed to fulfill his duty to inform his principal of all facts of which he was aware that might affect the player's interests. player or influence his actions (Champion, 1996). ). This case is a striking example of an agent acting in his own best interest, as opposed to that of the athletes. Another case highlighting a breach of fiduciary duties is the case of Zinn V. Parrish (Champion, 1996). Sports agent Leo Zinn was hired by football player Lemar Parrish to provide advice regarding business and tax matters, negotiate contracts, screen investment information, seek endorsements and assist with aoff-season employment (Epstein and Niland, 2009). It was agreed between the two men that Zinn would receive a ten percent commission on all contracts he negotiated on Parrish's behalf (Epstein and Niland, 2009). In 1974, Zinn successfully completed a contract on behalf of Parrish with the Cincinnati Bengals (Epstein & Niland, 2009). Having failed to complete the majority of the other agreed-upon tasks, Parrish fired Zinn and refused to pay him the ten percent commission (Epstein & Niland, 2009). ,2009). Zinn sued Parrish to try to recover his fees (Champion, 1996). Parrish argued that Zinn acted as an investment advisor rather than an agent, which caused the contract to be void since the agent was not registered (Champion, 1996). Zinn is a prime example of an officer who does not perform his duties in good faith. In recent years, sport has become a multi-billion dollar industry (Garbarino, 1994). As this occurred, sports greed's concept of gambling agent expanded with (Ring, 1987) describing player agents as "destructive, devious and incompetent". According to (Crandall, 1981), agents often receive an average of ten percent of what an athlete earns from all sources. When negotiating a contract, agents often act in their best interest, such that they receive their fees immediately, even if it is a guaranteed non-profit contract (Crandall, 1981). This means that if an athlete signed a long-term contract, the agent would be overcompensated because the player might not fulfill the full term of his contract (Crandall, 1981). An example of this is the case of Burrow V. Probus Management, Inc. (Burke, 1993). In this case, the district judge concluded that the football player who was advised by his agent to accept a lump sum bonus was not in the client's best interest, but in order to enable the agent to earn money. the money immediately, which created a tax liability (Burke, 1993). Due to the sharp increase in revenues in sports, some sports agents have increased their prices accordingly and charge up to twenty-five percent of all contracts they secure for their athlete, which is an exceptionally large share of the player's salary (Crandall, 1981). . This high demand led to agents being accused and accused of collecting an excessive amount of commission from players' contracts (Crandall, 1981). In Brown V. Woolf, Robert Woolf was hired on behalf of Brown to discuss a contract with the Pittsburgh Penguins (King, 1987). This was at a time when the popularity of the World Hockey Association was growing (King, 1987). This could be used by players as a negotiating tool and give them the opportunity to increase their demands (King, 1987). Brown chose to join the WHA and Woolf got the contract (King, 1987). Unfortunately for Brown, instability in the league forced the renegotiation of the original agreement (King, 1987). The new contract included a reduction in compensation and the elimination of a retirement fund (King, 1987). Despite this reduction, Woolf claimed her full fee from the original contract as well as compensation (King, 1987). In the end, Woolf only managed to receive twenty-one percent of the twenty-four percent that her client Brown received (King, 1987). This illustrates the modern trend in sports where player agents' fees are based on what the athlete actually receives and reflects the greed of player agents. There is fierce competition between agents for athlete signatures, due to the high potential earnings (Shropshire, 1995). The Dallas Cowboys star's $13.6 million contract is just one example (Shropshire,1995). Based on salary alone, his agent is expected to earn $136,000 per year over a four-year period (Shropshire, 1995). With luxurious salaries like this boasted by both professional athletes and agents, it is not surprising to see a high demand for people wanting to become athletes' agents (Garbarino, 1994). Unfortunately, the demand for agent life has created an influx in the ratio of potential agents to professional or superstar athletes (Willenbacher, 2004). In April 2002, the NFL Players Association reported that nearly 800 of 1,200 certified agents did not have a single client (Willenbacher, 2004). This has led to many agents being willing to do whatever it takes in exchange for signing amateur athletes (Willenbacher, 2004). This has prompted agents to resort to illegal, unethical and unscrupulous approaches, which undoubtedly has an impact on amateur sport (Willenbacher, 2004). Agents who attempted to persuade players to sign then violated National Collegiate Athletic Association rules by offering money and other unethical tactics to recruit athletes (Shropshire, 1989). The primary goal of the NCAA is to prepare universities for professional sports (Shropshire, 1989). The NCAA established rules governing the eligibility of student-athletes in order to maintain college eligibility and preserve amateurism (Shropshire, 1989)(Crandall, 1981). NCAA regulations do not have the force of law, meaning that officers are not required to follow the rules and do not punish those who follow them (Shropshire, 1989). (Crandall, 1981) states that agents recruiting college athletes before they have completed their education is the most common form of agent abuse. Bad advice is another agent-created problem that causes unnecessary litigation (Crandall, 1981). This occurs when professional sports teams recruit college players before their college eligibility expires (Crandall, 1981). Many athletes who sign these secret contracts eventually break them to sign for other teams, thus worsening an already unethical situation (Crandall, 1981). Generally, the court sides with the athlete in this case because it considers the first contract to be unenforceable (Crandall, 1981). The case of the Houston Oilers, Inc. V. Neely is an example of litigation (Whitehall, 1981). In this case, Ralph Neely secretly signed a contract with the Houston Oilers before his college eligibility expired (Whitehall, 1981). Neely then broke this contract and signed with another team (Whitehall, 1981). Surprisingly, the court ruled against Neely on this occasion stating that while secretly signing a contract is prohibited, negotiating the contract at any time is not and therefore does not allow the athlete to ignore his contract (Whitehill, 1981). Neely was forced to terminate his original contract with the Oilers (Crandall, 1981). Personally, I'm a fan of having an agent. I believe that any young athlete, male or female, with the ability to achieve great success and thereby earn a large sum of money would be naive not to hire a professional agent. Unfortunately, the difficulty with hiring an agent is that there are very few reputable agents. These days, agents abuse their clients and primarily focus on their own needs rather than those of their athletes. In my opinion, money in sports has led to high demands from people wanting to become agents, which is dangerous for professional athletes but even more so for amateur athletes. With the request to become.1225.