More than thirty million Kurds live as besieged ethnic minorities who experience varying degrees of political, ethnic, linguistic and cultural discrimination in a geographical area which includes Turkey and Iraq. , Iran and Syria. The claimed territories in the aforementioned countries are referred to by Kurdish nationalists as "Greater Kurdistan". Countries that host Kurdish nationalists are often subject to separatist aspirations and face constant threats to their respective territorial integrity. The United States used the Kurdish invasion of Iraq after 2003 as one of its main tools to project power in the region. My research paper will explain why Iraqi Kurdish nationalism experienced a steady decline after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why violent video games should not be banned”?Get the original essay Iran maintains significant influence in Iraq – not only with the central government in Baghdad, but also with the Kurds. Therefore, as Iraqi Kurdish nationalism continues to decline due to lack of U.S. support and recognition of Kurdish independence, the United States will face difficulties in attempting to project power in the region. . Former US ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, Ryan Crocker, says the US appears to be taking Baghdad's side in the conflict with the Kurds. The central government in Baghdad is dominated by Shiite Muslims and is therefore supported by Iran. As tensions between the United States and Iran continue to escalate, the United States will lose the ability to leverage the Kurds to project power. Furthermore, Crocker asserts that the situation "is up to the Kurds and the Iraqis to sort out, but putting us on one side, the concern is that we will no longer be seen as an honest broker as we move forward." Despite the conflicting interests between the United States, Iran, Turkey, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries all share a common goal: stability in Iraq. The decline of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism has created the prospect of a new conflict in Iraq. In order to explain the decline of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism, three states will be used: the United States, Iraq and Iran. The United States will represent a push factor that will attempt to support Kurdish nationalism for the national security of the United States. Iran and Turkey will be used as pull factors, which will effectively wage a war against Kurdish nationalism to protect control of their central government. By using Iran and Iraq, I hope to emphasize that the decline of Kurdish nationalism is due in large part to the lack of independence from the international community. Additionally, we observe disagreements among scholars over which country (Iran, Iraq, the United States, etc.) has had the greatest influence on Kurdish nationalism. Finally, I will examine the internal workings of Kurdish society and how it changed after 2003, particularly through the use of party networks and power dynamics between classes, generations and genders. I hope to emphasize that the emergence of localized identities, largely due to regional unrest, has hindered a unified Kurdish nationalist identity and mobilization. The combination of external and internal forces in Kurdish nationalism complicates the attempt to uncover the driving force behind the decline of Kurdish nationalism after 2003. First, I will examine the Iraqi central government asfactor of Kurdish nationalism. The view of the Iraqi central government has been, and still is, that Kurdish succession would constitute a direct challenge to Baghdad's authority. However, the Iraqi central government faced significant challenges after the American invasion, namely the decimation of the Iraqi army by American forces. Additionally, Iraq has faced a financial crisis, sectarian conflict, political divisions, a fledgling economy, and the inability to provide daily services to its citizens due to decades of war. The Iraqi central government is also sensitive to regional regimes, such as Iran's, economic and military actions if Iraq grants sovereignty to the Kurds. Second, I will examine Iran as a factor in Kurdish nationalism. Above all, Iran fears that granting Kurdish independence to Iraq will embolden its vast population of repressed Kurds. If Iraq granted independence to the Kurds, Iran could benefit through economic development and political reforms, extending its control over the new regional state. On the other hand, a unilateral and brutal announcement of Kurdish independence could lead to repression against Kurds in Iran. This effort, led by the Iranian government, would aim to stifle any hope of Kurdish-Iranian independence. Third, I will examine the United States as a factor in Kurdish nationalism. Iraq's Kurds are essentially aligning themselves with Washington's values ​​simply because they want to oust the Iraqi central government. The reasoning is simple: without an Iraqi central government, the Kurds will be able to fill the power vacuum and achieve independence. However, the newly formed Iraqi government by the United States after the 2003 invasion did not grant the Kurds full independence. On the contrary, he granted the Kurds a more visible role in the new central government (created in 2004), such as control of the positions of army chief of staff, minister of foreign affairs and minister of foreign affairs. Finance. Despite these new powers, Kurdish political influence began to decline shortly after 2004 due to the emergence of an Arab-Kurdish rivalry for domestic control of Iraq. For example, as Sunni and Shia political parties became better organized, Kurdish influence was diluted and the promulgation of constitutional provisions was delayed. The majority of constitutional provisions would have granted concessions to the Kurds on controversial issues. Most notably, Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution after the 2003 invasion provided for a referendum to resolve disagreements over the disputed territories. This was never implemented. Therefore, while many U.S. government officials assert that support for the Kurds is imperative for regional stability, the United States has failed to secure Kurdish independence during the power vacuum that followed the invasion of 2003. This lack of support from the United States had a direct impact on the decline of Kurdish nationalism after 2003. In 2015, the president of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, declared: "The moment has come to decide our fate, and we should not wait for others to decide it for us.” Finally, I will examine changes in internal Kurdish identity. It can be argued that the unrest in the region has led the international community to view Kurdistan as a relatively stable area. However, the unrest has also created differences of opinion among the Kurds. Localized identities and regional autonomy began to emerge after the 2003 US invasion, which prevented the mobilization of a unified identity of the