The dirty hands problem, as posed by Michael Walzer, has played an important role in the ongoing debate over the violation of certain moral rules in politics. The fundamental dilemma is that in politics, individuals will often be faced with the need to make a decision between morally wrong actions. Given this, is it still possible to do the right thing? Among the many situations that can lead to committing a mistake in the exercise of a political function, there is the decision to resort to torture. A wrong that has received particular distinction, as many states and international law prohibit its use. This essay aims to evaluate whether or not torture should be treated differently according to the same logic of dirty hands reasoning. It will not evaluate the morality of torture or dispute the existence of dirty hands scenarios, but rather will address the issue of torture in the context of a pre-existing and normalized use of violence by the state and argue that torture, while perhaps morally wrong, is not significantly different from other wrongs and should be evaluated in similar terms. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay “Liberal Democrat Torture” by Steven Lukes gives us a well-advanced argument for distinguishing torture from other human-hands scenarios. For Lukes, dirty hands reasoning is not applicable to torture, particularly in the case of a liberal democracy where individuals in positions of political power can be held responsible for moral wrongs they might commit (Lukes 12-13). recalling that in a situation of dirty hands, a political person does not have the right to do what is deemed necessary given certain constraints: rather, he or she may be right precisely because he or she is aware that what he or she does is evil, just like us, writes Walzer: “it is by his dirty hands that we know him”. Liberal democracy allows the public to hold politicians accountable for the wrongs they commit and, critically, according to Lukes, to support the institution of liberal values. Yet he argues that torture, unlike other institutional wrongs, cannot be held accountable in the same way, since it cannot be legitimate and is not punishable. Torture according to him commits two "vices", a "vice of dissimulation", where the act is not publicly recognized, and is disavowed once revealed, as well as a "vice of violence" where (quoting Henry Shue) torture represents a violation. of “the primitive moral prohibition against attacking defenseless people”. Lukes is careful to note that this “defect of concealment” is not unique to torture, as many institutional wrongs are committed in secret. Yet these wrongs may be popularly approved of in the circumstances, while torture contains this character in tandem with a public attitude that is fiercely opposed to its use. Lukes says torture is initially repugnant to the general public precisely because it violates our liberal values ​​of fairness and respect for human dignity. Citing Durkheim, he argues that this “threatens moral disintegration” and undermines the bonds on which the institutions of liberal democracy are based. Thus, torture does not meet the otherwise necessary conditions of a wrong that can be assessed within the framework of dirty hands; the distinction given to it as distinct from other wrongs is valid. Luke's argument is based on the idea that torture is 15).. 2 (1973): 160-80.