The aim of this assignment is to explore the effects of how EU law has shaped and influenced media regulation in the UK . It is essential that the mission focuses on the competence of the Council of Europe and the European Union. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why violent video games should not be banned"?Get the original essayThe "media" whose regulation I am discussing are the public means of mass communication, particularly the press, radio and television, but also cinema and recorded music as well as a number of new means of distribution by cable, satellite, Internet, etc. The Internet is of growing importance, which can now be considered a "mass media" in its own right due to its gradual diffusion to majorities in many countries and its use for a number of public communication functions in the field of entertainment and information. The boundary between public and private communication is important from a regulatory perspective, but it is much more important. less easy to identify than in the past, particularly compared to the Internet which serves as a means of personal communication as well as a means of dissemination and a form of publication. To some extent, the same is true for mobile phones. Regulation refers to the whole process of control or guidance, through established rules and procedures, applied by governments and other political and administrative authorities to all kinds of media activities. Thus, regulation is always a potential intervention in ongoing activities, usually for a stated objective of "public interest", but also to meet market needs (for example, by supporting competition) or for reasons of technical efficiency (for example, by defining technical rules). Regulation takes many forms, from clauses in national constitutions and laws to administrative procedures and technical specifications. Regulation can be both internal and external. In the first case, we generally speak of "self-regulation", where internal controls are applied, sometimes in response to public pressure or external criticism. The Council of Europe is the oldest political body in Europe. The body was established shortly after the end of World War II in 1949. The council includes most, but not all, European countries. In total, the Council of Europe has 47 member states, some of which are arguably not geographically located in Europe. The stated objectives of the Council are to defend human rights, the rule of law in Europe, democracy and to promote European culture. Unlike the EU, the Council of Europe is not able to create binding laws, but it does have the power to enforce certain international agreements concluded by European states on many subjects. A well-known body of the Council of Europe is the European Court. of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights applies the European Convention on Human Rights. The Council of Europe has been defending the idea of ​​media self-regulation for many years. Over the years, the virtues of media self-regulation and the vices of state regulation have been debated in numerous seminars and recommendations. For example, in the Explanatory Memorandum to “Recommendation (2001) 8 on self-regulation concerning cyber content”, the Committee of Ministers noted that “self-regulation has become an important and recognized mechanism for the media to avoid legislationrestrictive state in matters of diffusion”. information through the media, particularly on questions of decency and moral values ​​which differ widely between individuals and States, while guaranteeing respect for certain standards, certain actors in the new communication and information services have taken initiatives to create their own self-regulatory mechanisms”[1].More recently, in a discussion paper on “Ethical journalism and human rights”, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights , Thomas Hammarberg, argued that "reworking notions of media accountability calls for a new vision of media regulation, one that goes beyond bureaucratic frameworks of journalism control and that encourages self-regulation as a positive force for setting standards." high standards and uphold them. This can be achieved by adapting existing press councils or state media commissions, but less complex forms of peer review will continue, such as the use of editors-in-chief or ombudsmen, or professional journals, as well as systematic media monitoring and reporting by non-media actors. government organizations and human rights organizations. New systems may benefit from legal guarantees, but if they do not fit the mold of autonomy and give an independent voice to civil society, they will constantly face the danger of political or industrial influence undue”[2]. In a November 2011 commentary, he stated that self-regulation "protects the independence of the media". But this question has never been directly examined in the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights. The Court has never analyzed the question of “self-regulation” versus “state regulation” from the perspective of Article 10. The basic position seems clear. Firstly, a system of compulsory media regulation constitutes prima facie an interference with the right to freedom of expression and must therefore be justified under Article 10(2). Second, such a system, if adopted into law, would clearly comply with the law and serve a legitimate purpose (e.g., protecting the rights of others). Accordingly, thirdly, the crucial question would be whether the system was “necessary in a democratic society” – whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Nevertheless, some general arguments can be made in favor of the proposition that no form of compulsory regulation could ever be justified under Article 10(2). An important argument arises from the wording of Article 10 itself. Article 10(1) – the provision which guarantees the right to freedom of expression – states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and communicate information and ideas without interference from public authorities and regardless of borders. This section does not prevent States from requiring licensing of radio, television, or motion picture undertakings. The third sentence seems to envisage licensing broadcasters and cinemas, but not print media. It could therefore be argued that Article 10 appears to have been drafted on the basis that 'licensing' the print media was unacceptable and that compulsory regulation was, in essence, a form of licensing. However, this interpretation does not seem to be compatible with the objective of the third sentence of Article 10(1). This situation was explained in the case of Groppera Radio AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 321. Groppera Radio AG , a limited company ofSwiss law, has its headquarters in Zug (canton of Zug) and produces radio programs. Jürg Marquard, Hans-Elias Fröhlich and Marcel Caluzzi are all Swiss nationals. Mr. Marquard is a publisher and lives in Zug; he manages Groppera Radio AG and is its statutory representative and sole shareholder. Mr. Fröhlich, journalist and contributor to Groppera Radio AG, lives in Thalwil (canton of Zurich). Mr. Caluzzi is also employed by the company as a journalist and resides in Cernobbio in Italy but also has a home in Lucerne. The Court observes that Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 does not contain a provision corresponding to the third sentence of Article 10, paragraph 1. The negotiating history of Article 19 shows that the inclusion of such a provision in this article was proposed with the aim of granting licenses not to the information communicated, but rather to the technical means of dissemination, in order to avoid chaos in the use of frequencies. However, its inclusion was challenged on the grounds that it could be used to hinder freedom of expression, and it was decided that such a provision was not necessary because authorization in the intended sense was considered to be covered by the reference to “public order” in the text. paragraph 3 of the article. This supports the conclusion that the purpose of the third sentence of Article 10(1) of the Convention is to clarify that States are authorized to control, by means of a licensing system, the manner in which broadcasting is organized. in their country. territories, particularly in its technical aspects. It does not, however, provide that authorization measures are not otherwise subject to the requirements of paragraph 2 (art. 10-2), as this would lead to a result contrary to the object and purpose of Article 10 taken in its entirety. Consequently, the wording of Article 10(1) sheds no light on the general acceptability of mandatory media regulation under Article 10. A number of arguments can be put forward in favor of the compatibility of compulsory media regulation with Article 10 in an appropriate case. First, the Court's jurisprudence supports to some extent the existence of a positive obligation to engage in appropriate media regulation. The Court of Human Rights has repeatedly emphasized in recent years that the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 must be weighed against the right to reputation guaranteed by Article 8. This led the Grand Chamber to say that "Contracting States are authorized, indeed obliged, by their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention... to regulate the exercise of freedom of expression in such a way as to ensure protection adequate by the law of the reputation of individuals”. , they must not do so in a manner that unduly discourages the media from fulfilling their role of alerting the public to an apparent or suspected abuse of public authority” Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania[3]. The Grand Chamber then stressed that investigative journalists should not be prevented from covering subjects of general public interest by the risk of a prison sentence or a ban on exercising their profession. No system of compulsory regulation envisaged by the Leveson inquiry would involve sanctions of this type. Second, it could be argued that mandatory regulation of large publishers is fundamentally different from licensing journalists. The latter means that it is not allowed to write for the media without being a member of a state-approved organization. The first means that some publishers, but not all, must obey certain basic rules if they want to beauthorized to publish. Third, it is well established that compulsory regulation of broadcast media and advertising is acceptable under Article 10, provided it is necessary and proportionate. There is in principle no difference between compulsory regulation in these areas and compulsory regulation of the written press. The question is whether the requirements of Article 10(2) are met. Finally, the question of whether a particular interference with a right recognized by the Convention is justified is “fact specific”: it is necessary to examine the precise characteristics of the proposed system. . The nature of the regulator and the code it applies would be relevant factors in the exercise of proportionality, as would the extent of application of the mandatory regime. The Court would also take into account the “harms” that the regulatory system was intended to address. A system of mandatory regulation for large publishers recommended by the Leveson inquiry would be designed to tackle the “harms” of mass invasion of rights identified by the inquiry. If a regulator were independent of government influence and enforced a code developed with substantial input from the media and journalists, all of these factors would be considered by the Court in the “justification exercise.” In summary, although the Council of Europe has strongly encouraged self-regulation, it is likely that compulsory regulation of the written press will not, in itself, be incompatible with the requirements of Article 10. Compatibility will depend on the precise form of mandatory regulation that is proposed and the justifications for it. Care will likely be taken to ensure that investigative journalism is not hindered and that coercion is confined to large and powerful publishers. In these circumstances, provided that a system of mandatory regulation remains completely independent of government, it seems likely that it would be considered compatible with Article 10. Media law jurisprudence and former legislation Economic Community of the European Union (EEC), today's European Union (EU) is characterized to a large extent by the EU's emphasis on the development of a common market rather than the pursuit of human rights standards. Under European law, media goods and services were primarily seen as economic goods. In the Sacchi judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) ruled that the broadcast of television signals, including those having the nature of advertisements, fell within the Treaty rules relating to services[4]. In the case of Procureur du Roi v Debauve, the ECJ also included the transnational transmission of broadcast signals by cable television in the Treaty rules relating to services[5]. But later, the CEE/EU also recognized the media as a factor of public interest with implications that go far beyond the market, such as cultural diversity, the right to information, diversity of opinion and media plurality, protection of minors and consumer protection. Furthermore, it was the ECJ which introduced human rights into the Community legal order. Since then, fundamental rights have been an integral part of the general principles of law that the Court observes. The ECJ's case law on freedom of expression particularly concerned statements by EU officials and the relationship between freedom of expression and fundamental freedoms around the world. now Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), freedom of expression supporting a claim for free movement or constituting a legitimate interest capable of justifying a [15]