response to Singer. Cullity argues that Singer's conclusion, that we should help others in need as long as it does not cause us significant harm, is very demanding because it essentially argues that we are morally obligated to help everyone in the world . The only way we could justify not helping someone who needs our help would be if it would put the person helping in significant danger. Cullity argues in his article that Singer's argument asks too much of people when he claims that donating to humanitarian agencies is a moral obligation and that not doing so would be immoral. His main way of doing this is to reject the harsh demand. Severe demand according to Cullity can be defined as follows: I should continue contributing to aid agencies until: a) There are no more lives for these agencies to save. b) Contributing more money would in itself hurt me enough to excuse my failing to save a single life directly at that cost. Cullity argues that the conclusion that we should always help others who are in need as long as it does not cause us significant harm is too demanding; it seems that most personal resource sources accomplishment would be morally unacceptable if the donation request to humanitarian agencies had to be fully met. If, for example, I wanted to do something with my free time that involved what could be considered unnecessary spending, this would be considered immoral because in theory the money you would spend on yourself could have been spent on donate to a humanitarian agency that could use it. money to save a child's life. It is for this reason that Cullity argues in his article that the harsh requirement can be rejected from an appropriate point of view...... middle of paper...... morally obligatory, the way Singer suggest people do this it's just too demanding. People cannot reasonably be expected to continue donating to charity to the point where their lives would be seriously endangered. Cullity instead concludes that we should donate to charity until there are no more lives to save or until "your overall sacrifice, with respect to those non-profit-oriented goods." altruism which can be impartially defended as permitted, is sufficiently important to justify your refusal to save a life directly at that price. He says it is true to say that this conclusion demands more of us than most people find acceptable, but that its demands are moderate, not harsh. I believe that Cullity's version of Miller's argument is less demanding, which can only work in his favor..