In the United Kingdom today, no issue of public concern appears to be as widely and passionately debated as that of terrorism. When people hear about terrorist attacks, they react with horror and disgust (rightly so). However, whether terrorism can ever be justified is almost never discussed. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer lays the groundwork for the circumstances in which terrorism can be morally justified in what he calls the "supreme emergency." This essay aims to critically analyze Walzer's concept of "supreme emergency" and his efforts to integrate it within the ordinary strictures of jus in bello, in accordance with the just war tradition. First of all, this essay will seek to define what terrorism actually is before discussing the situation of supreme emergency and the arguments in favor of this possibility of violating the rules of jus in bello. This essay will then discuss the limitations inherent in this concept and the scholars' arguments against Walzer. Finally, this essay will question whether the concept of supreme emergency can only apply to state actors and not non-state actors before concluding that unless one adheres to moral absolutism, then in a situation of In the supreme emergency, terrorism can be justified. One of the problems with terrorism is that there is no universally accepted definition. Valls notes how divisions exist between political actors and academics when it comes to defining terrorism. Indeed, the word terrorism is used by politicians as a political weapon in an attempt to portray their opponents as monsters, while researchers seek to define what captures the essence of terrorism. Valls further states that he shares Teichman's view on terrorism, who writes: "We should not start by defining terrorism as a bad thing." By characterizing terrorism as intrinsically evil and unjustifiable, you then prejudge the basic moral question by a definitional consideration according to Valls (2000). This may seem paradoxical, but we will see later in this essay how this is relevant to justifying the concept of supreme emergency. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay Another problem with the definition of terrorism is due to the lack of agreement on who can commit terrorism. In their famous song about IRA hunger striker Joe McDonnell, the Wolfe Tones wrote: "And you cared to call me a terrorist, while you looked down at your gun" in reference to the army British who, like the IRA, committed acts that many would condemn as terrorism. There is no clear consensus on the identity of the perpetrators of terrorism. For example, the definition of terrorism adopted by the United States government excludes state actors, which has been criticized. Igor Primoratz, on the other hand, argues that “terrorism cannot be based on the identity of those who resort to it and must therefore be expanded to include ‘state terrorism’” (Primotatz, 2007, p. 33). Indeed, as he argues, states are among the biggest actors in terrorism. For the purposes of this essay, we will use Rodin's definition of terrorism as "the deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against non-combatants, by state or non-state actors for ideological purposes and in absence of a substantially fair legal procedure” (Rodin, 2004, p.754). This allows us to critique state and non-state concepts of terrorism. ThereJust war theory is a highly articulated and widely used paradigm for analyzing the morality of international relations, particularly war. Stevens argues that just war theory can be applied to other forms of violence, including terrorism. Like war, he believes that "terrorism may be a strategic decision, following a deliberate cost-benefit analysis, to engage in violent struggle in order to redress past grievances or improve current conditions." While the killing of non-combatants has long been considered a fundamental principle of the conduct of war which must not be transgressed, it has been argued that in extreme conditions, innocent non-combatant civilians could be taken for target. Michael Walzer, otherwise a strong proponent of jus in bello in war, argues that under conditions of supreme emergency, a state can rightly ignore the moral principles and rules of the just war tradition and deliberately target enemy civilians, if certain circumstances are met. In accordance with the definition of terrorism given by Rodin (2004), a supreme emergency is therefore an act of state terrorism because it targets non-combatants in times of war. A Supreme Emergency, according to Walzer, constitutes "...an ultimate threat to all that is decent in our lives, an ideology and practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond all calculation. , infinitely horrible” (Walzer, 2015, p.253). For a supreme emergency situation to arise, two conditions must be met. First, a state must find itself in imminent threat of danger, with no means of defending itself and all other options exhausted, and second, the nature of the threat must be so serious, such as the threat of total destruction of the way of life of the state. and human values ​​of the present and future. Both of these conditions must be met for a state to be morally permitted to target the enemy civilian population if that is the only military option available. A supreme emergency constitutes a dilemma according to Walzer: it is a dilemma in which one must choose between two evils and opt for the lesser. Therefore, a political leader faced with a supreme emergency should choose the “best” alternative, even if that act itself is morally wrong. Circumstances of supreme emergency are rare due to the strict conditions that must be met to be able to override them. the rules of war. However, one example that highlights the case for a true supreme emergency according to Walzer is the British bombing of German cities like Dresden during World War II. Walzer cites this as a truly supreme emergency, because Britain's decision to drop bombs on German civilians was taken at a time when Allied victory was not in sight and the specter of defeat faced to Nazi Germany, which would have had unimaginable and disastrous consequences. to Britain's values, way of life and future, was always present. With all other military options exhausted or deemed ineffective, targeted strikes on the German civilian population were Britain's last resort to turn the tide of the war. Although tragic, Walzer defends the British decision to commit an act of terrorism in this case with the following argument: "...a world in which entire peoples are enslaved or massacred is literally unbearable. Because the survival and freedom of political communities are the highest values ​​of international society” (Walzer, 2015, p.254). Walzer further emphasizesthat the supreme emergency argument should reinforce professional ethics and explain when it is permissible, even necessary, to get one's hands dirty. For Walzer, the possibility of a Nazi invasion of Britain would be unbearable for the political community, and it would therefore be completely irresponsible to adhere to a moral rule if the only way to prevent this disaster was to break those rules . He argues that moral absolutism “represents…a refusal to think about what the falling of the sky means. And the history of the 20th century makes this refusal very difficult to justify” (Walzer, 2005, p. 37). Walzer therefore takes a consequentialist approach to the morality of terrorism according to which terrorism, like anything else, must be judged solely by its consequences. And when the rationally expected consequences are good on balance, they will be morally justified. Walzer is correct when he asserts that terrorism can be justified under tragic conditions of supreme emergency. In the case of the British bombing of German cities during World War II, this constituted a truly supreme emergency and was morally justified on the grounds that the alternative (Nazi occupation of Britain) would have been far more disastrous for many more people. Therefore, terrorism arising from a supreme emergency like that of Britain during World War II can be justified. Walzer's argument for justifying state terrorism in the context of a supreme emergency has attracted much attention and criticism. Many, like Giroux (2015), believe that terrorism in all its forms must be denounced without reservation and without exception, whether by States, revolutionaries or religious and ideological activists. While others, such as Cook and Coady, do not believe that Walzer's Supreme Emergency should constitute any art of a moral theory of war or political violence by reassuring that such authorization of killing innocent civilians in extreme situations risks being applied leniently. However, Walzer clearly states that the principles of just war must not be violated until all other options have been exhausted and that, with this, the threat of imminence and danger must always be present, which would make a lenient application of this concept difficult. Furthermore, Cook criticizes, among others, Walzer for giving too strong a preference to the “political community” (Cook, 2007, p. 141). Igor Primoratz agrees with Cook's assertion that "...while the genocide, explosion, or enslavement of an entire people may be considered a moral disaster that can be avoided by any means, the loss of political independence of a political community is, at most, a disaster.” political disaster” (Primoratz, 2007, p.19). For Primoratz, the decisive aspect for considering a situation as a supreme emergency is whether there is a threat of genocide, slavery or ethnic cleansing. However, the threat to the “continuity” of a political community is not serious enough to constitute a supreme emergency when terrorism may be a justified recourse. However, whatever conditions Walzer and Primoratz disagree with regarding a supreme emergency, they both agree that terrorism, in some cases, can be justified. Both Walzer and Primoratz agree that in a situation of supreme emergency, while the act is tragic and wrong to some extent, a political leader has the right to attack innocent civilians. Orend, for his part, believes that in cases of supreme emergency, a person is "forced todoing terrible things to survive” and can therefore be “excused”, but never justified. It can be emphasized that the immunity of innocent civilians from attack is an absolute moral principle that can never be justifiably violated due to the human rights of victims, such as violation of life and limb. . However, Schwenkenbecher (2009) demonstrates that actors are not simply excused for killing innocent people in a situation of supreme emergency, but they are morally obligated to do so. According to Schwenkenbecher, if a political actor has a moral obligation to act in a certain way (e.g. Churchill being required to protect British citizens during World War II), then he is morally justified in doing so. Taking an absolutist moral stance in times of supreme emergency would be completely irresponsible, and if targeting innocent people would avert moral disaster, then it would be morally wrong not to take these appropriate measures (Schewnkenbecher, 2009). As Walzer (2015) argues, “utilitarian calculus can force us to violate the rules of war”; adopting an absolutist position by obeying the moral law in times of supreme emergency would be more unjustified than committing an act of terrorism in times of supreme emergency, because the former would have far worse consequences. A final point to consider concerns the perpetrators of terrorism. and who can be justified in committing such acts. When it comes to terrorism, Walzer appears to hold a double standard when it comes to state and non-state actors. For non-state actors, terrorism is a strategy that characterizes the deliberate violation of ethical and political norms and is therefore indefensible and unjust. However, as previously mentioned, he also considers (and justifies) the bombing of German cities like Dresden by the British during World War II as an act of "terrorism". Walzer is therefore inconsistent in his approach to terrorism and Valls (2000) complains of codifying a “pro-state bias” to the extent that his argument of supreme emergency is only accessible to states and their representatives. Furthermore, Coady (1985) argues that philosophically this double standard cannot be sustained and argues that consistency requires that we apply the same standards to both types of political violence, state and non-state. Can non-state acts of terrorism therefore be justified in the same way as state acts? Valls claims that it is possible and argues that, under the most plausible interpretation of just war theory, taking into account the ultimate basis of its criteria, political violence undertaken by non-state actors can, in principle, meet the requirements of a just war. According to Walzer, for a supreme emergency to be justified, you can ignore jus in bello if all other options are exhausted and a disaster for the “political community” is imminent and serious (Walzer, 2015). However, political communities are not limited to nation states alone. Political communities can include a wide range of groups, including racial, ethnic, and religious groups. For example, according to Walzer's definition of a supreme emergency, during World War II, European Jewry faced a supreme emergency due to the Holocaust. Even if European Jews did not constitute a state, would a group of Jewish militants be justified in attacking German civilians if it gave any hope of stopping or minimizing the genocide of their people? Even if it involves horrific wrongdoing, you have a duty to protect yourself and your community, whether you are a state actor or not (Valls, 2000). In the. 34: 3–12.