In this article, I will examine Nagasena's view of no-self and question his demand for a permanent self. I will argue that the self exists because it is created, that the self exists from its point of creation. I will then attempt to justify the premises of my argument as they help resolve the claim that the memory and history of the self, which Nagasena does not account for, is what defines the self. In The Questions of King Milinda, Nagasena argues that the self does not exist. Using the analogy of the chariot, he argues: 1) The chariot is not just its post, axle, wheels, or any other of its constituent parts. 2) The tank is nothing apart from its constituent parts. 3) The tank is not all its constituent parts. Therefore, the tank does not exist. Rather, the name "tank" is just a "generally understood term" for something that brings together all the constituent parts of the tank. The names of compound things are just empty sounds that exist as ideas and are used to refer to all of its constituent parts when put together in reality. In relation to the self, the names we attribute to it would then have “no permanent individuality involved in [the] name,” because there is no fixed set of constituent parts that would form the same self. The constituent parts of the self are continually changing, and therefore the name we use for a self does not refer to the same combination and arrangement of a particular group of constituent parts over time. This is why he believes that "there is no permanent individuality involved in this affair", where the affair refers to his name, "Nagasena" and the self to which the name refers. As such, the name we use to re...... middle of paper ......previous. Because it requires the self to have permanent individuality, the self does not exist. If we remove this requirement, then the self can exist. However, basing the existence of the self on memory and history gives rise to controversy. To respond to these assertions, I therefore propose to link the self to its creation over time as a permanent factor. This relationship does not limit the existence of the self to require that all its constituent parts remain permanent, so that the changes that the self undergoes can be considered part of it, but at the same time have a permanent property, which is the moment when it occurs. was created.Works Cited “Maverick Philosopher: Can the Chariot Take Us to the Land of No Self?” ". Np 18 Mac 2011. Web. November 22. 2013. .