It states that for S to know that p, S must believe that p. In colloquial terms, someone knows something, if that something is true. And, again, as we saw before, this is a necessary condition. Since the theory claims that this condition must be present for there to be knowledge. However, there is an obvious potential problem with this condition, or rather with what is meant by "believes." An aspect of psychological repression: repressed memory can be argued as a counterexample to this condition. In this example, there appears to be knowledge of something without “believing” in the event. If I have been in a car accident and I am aware that I have been in a car accident, I know that there is a certain degree of danger in car accidents. However, I managed to escape unscathed and I do not “believe” that there was any danger in my situation. The magnitude of the situation has not yet “hit me”, although I am aware of what happened. However, the fact that I subsequently refused to drive a car suggests that I was more or less aware of the danger, even if I chose not to address it to myself. So in this case the counterexample simply speaks to my level of awareness in the situation. Which is not particularly relevant for the definition of the theory in question. The theory assumes, with some certainty, that you have some form of belief in the given situation, it does not need to take into account the multiple states of consciousness that extend (but one could argue that it never exceeds ) the limits of what it is to know, but at the same time not