Jaegwon Kim believes that the multiple realizability of mental properties would lead to the conclusion that psychology is probably not a science. Several functionalists, particularly Fodor, take a position opposite to Kim's, arguing that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim thinks that for mental states to be repeatedly realizable, psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and extraterrestrial psychology encompassing mental states realized extraterrestrially, etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim's argument, they do not lead to his ultimate conclusion that psychology fails. a science. By attacking his principle of occasional individuation of species, I will show that Kim failed to find the right conclusion. Additionally, I will consider a possible objection Kim might have to my position and provide a brief rebuttal. I will conclude by explaining Jerry Fodor's account of Kim's essential problem. By showing that Kim's conclusion fails, it will imply that Fodor's conclusion is more viable in reality. Jaegwon Kim thinks that the multiple realizability of mental properties would lead to the conclusion that psychology is probably not a science. Several functionalists, particularly Fodor, take a position opposite to Kim's, arguing that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim thinks that for mental states to be repeatedly realizable, psychology must be fundamentally broken; with the psycho human...... middle of paper...... fortunately for Kim, he can't decide what official sanction is. As Fodor states in the conclusion of his 1997 article, one must attack not only generalizations, but also evidence, predictions, and then generalizations don't actually yield true results. As he puts it simply: “You have to actually do science” (Fodor, 1997, p. 162). Once you do this, you can clearly see that mental states can be realized in multiple ways as long as the results are logically confirmed. Through examples and explaining why Kim's conclusion is wrong, I have shown that Fodor's conclusion that psychology is a science is valid. Works Cited Kim, Jaegwon (1992), “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1 -26. Fodor, Jerry (1997), “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years”, Perspectives philosophical 11: 149-163.