In his Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus sets out his philosophy for achieving happiness and details the appropriate attitude that Epicureans should have towards the gods and towards death. In reference to the latter, following his argument about sensory experience and unnecessary pain, Epicurus states that “…death is nothing to us” (125). Epicurus's arguments regarding death are framed on the principle that death is “…the absence of life” (125), as in a state of permanent death, rather than a momentary act of death. However, it is impossible to reach the state of permanent death without experiencing a dying moment and Epicurus seems to neglect this inextricable link between state (permanent death) and cause of the state (momentary act of dying). It is therefore necessary to evaluate Epicurus's arguments on the basis of a comprehensive definition of "death", which includes both a momentary act of dying and a subsequent, permanent state of death. Both arguments are deductively valid, but will prove unfounded. Note that Epicurus' hedonistic value system will be accepted for the purposes of this article; pain will be considered bad and pleasure, defined as the absence of pain, will be considered good. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Epicurus' hedonistic value system is derived from his teleological views on the gods, a thorough evaluation of which would be beyond the scope of this article. Through the evaluation of the argument from sense experience and the argument from unnecessary pain of Epicurus, we will conclude that death cannot be "nothing" and that death must be feared in particular cases . Death is only bad if the momentary act of dying is painful and should only be feared if that pain is greater than the mental pain associated with the anticipation and fear of death. On the other hand, death is a good thing and should not be feared only if the momentary act of dying is pleasurable due to a marked reduction in pain, as this is made possible by the absence of pain pre-existing. First, Epicurus' argument from sense experience and argument from unnecessary pain will be reconstructed, clarified with additional textual references, and briefly evaluated in an overview. A thorough evaluation will follow and the conclusion of the previous paragraph will be demonstrated. Sense Experience Argument 1) All “…good and evil consist in sense experience” (124). 2) “Death is the deprivation of sensory experience” (124). 3) Death is neither good nor bad. This argument from sensory experience is deductively valid. Premise 1 can be further clarified with reference to his later comments on pleasure and pain. Pain is bad and pleasure – which Epicurus defines as the absence of pain – is good (128). Because it is through sensory experience that we perceive pleasure and pain, which are good and bad respectively, good and evil consist of sensory experience. Epicurus then also clarifies that pain refers to “…pain in the body or trouble in the soul” (131). All men aspire to pleasure as their primary good, as Epicurus defines pleasure as “…the first innate good” (129). Premise 2 can also be clarified by noting Epicurus' definition of death: “…absence of life” (125). Lifelessness represents a permanent state of death rather than a momentary act of death. While premise 1 will turn out to be true, premise 2 will turn out to be false, and therefore the sense experience argument will be found unfounded. Premise 2 can only be true ifthe permanent state of death is completely separate from the momentary act of dying, which Epicurus seems to suggest, but this is impossible. Because these are inextricably linked and it is impossible to reach the permanent state of death without experiencing either pleasure or pain at the moment of dying, death requires either a pleasant sensory experience or a painful sensory experience. Thus, premise 2 is false and the sensory experience argument is not strong. Epicurus extends his argument from sense experience to his argument from unnecessary pain in order to persuade his fellow Epicureans not to fear death, based on the idea that death is devoid of pain: Argument from unnecessary pain A) As long as it is present, death is painless and causes no distress (125). B) That which, although present, causes no distress causes unnecessary pain when anticipated (125). C) Death creates unnecessary pain when anticipated (125). The unnecessary pain argument is also deductively valid, but weak. Because premise A depends on premise 2 of Epicurus' sense experience argument, which has already been called false, premise A is also false. Because it is not always true that death is the deprivation of sense experience (Premise 2) due to the necessity of a momentary act of death in which sense experience is present, it is also false may death always be painless and cause no distress. (Premise A). Premise B will be refuted for the same reason: because the anticipation of death might lead an individual to avoid death and, thus, avoid a painful act of dying, it might actually avoid unnecessary pain. Therefore, Premise 2 of the Argument from Sense Experience as well as Premises A and B of the Argument from Unnecessary Pain will be refuted and both arguments will be shown to be unfounded, leading to the conclusion that death can be good or bad depending on the individual's situation. refuting Conclusion 3), and that it may be advantageous for an individual to anticipate death (refuting Conclusion C). First, Premise 1 of the Sense Experience Argument can be shown to be true by considering it in light of its most powerful counterarguments, leading to the conclusion that good and evil do consist good in the sensory experience. It can be argued that the removal of pain through death is a good thing and the removal of pleasure through death is bad. If a person has lived a life of constant pain, perhaps due to the mental and emotional pain of a life sentence or the physical pain caused by excruciating chronic health problems, removing their Pain in life can be seen as a good thing. Because it is bad to suffer, staying alive might also be bad because it allows the pain to continue. Therefore, staying alive in this scenario is bad due to the presence of pain. Epicurus also writes that the wise “…relishes not the longest but the most pleasant period [of life]” (126). If a life were destined to be absolutely painful and devoid of pleasure, the most pleasant (least painful) option would apparently be death, assuming that the momentary act of dying was not extremely painful. This counterargument is unfounded. Because the permanent state of death prohibits an individual from perceiving the absence of pain (pleasure), death is worse than even the most painful life, which would certainly have a finite number of pleasant moments to supplement the pain. Therefore, good would only exist in life, where sensory experience is possible and at least some pleasure can be felt.Although the reverse is also true: because the state of permanent death prohibits an individual from perceiving pain, death is better than even the most pleasant life, which would certainly have a finite number of painful moments alongside the abundant pleasant moments. In this scenario, evil would only exist through the sensory experience of life, where the sensation of pain would be felt. Therefore, premise 1 turns out to be true. Premise 2 of the sense experience argument, on the other hand, is false because one cannot enter the permanent state of death without experiencing the momentary act of dying, which is necessarily either painful or pleasant. Since the momentary act of dying is necessarily painful or pleasant, which is only possible through sensory experience, death (the moment of death plus the state of permanent death) is not the deprivation of sensory experience. Moments deon would expect death to be painful in some ways. If this moment were painful, the act of dying would be bad, according to Epicurus' definition, and is therefore to be feared. On the contrary, an individual's moment of death might instead be pleasant. If an individual suffered from excruciating “…pain in the body [or] disturbance in the soul” (131), the lesser pain of the moment of death might distract the other from greater pain physical or greater pain of the soul. Since Epicurus considers the absence of pain to be pleasure, the absence of some portion of net pain in the body or soul, due to the distraction of lesser pain, could be pleasant. Therefore, an individual's moment of death can be pleasant or painful. However, once this moment of death has continued to completion and the permanent state of death has begun, the sensory experience will cease. The permanent state of death is the deprivation of sense experience, but its obligatory companion, the momentary act of dying, is not the deprivation of sense experience, and premise 2 is therefore false. Because premise A of the argument from unnecessary pain is derived from premise 2 of the argument from sensory experience, premise A is also false. So far it appears that death is bad and should only be feared if the momentary act of dying is painful and that death is good and should only be feared if the momentary act of dying is pleasant in due to a marked reduction in pain. Premise B of the unnecessary pain argument is also false, because by fearing the permanent state of death (which causes no distress when present), an individual can be induced to avoid a painful act of dying. Epicurus seems to admit that it may be appropriate to fear the momentary act of dying, but not the permanent state of death, when he writes: "...he is a fool who says that he fears death not because that it will be painful when it is present, but because it is painful when it is still to come” (125). However, if anticipation and fear of the permanent state of death – which Epicurus considers senseless – leads an individual to act in such a way as to avoid a momentarily painful act of dying, the individual would avoid physical pain through his anticipation. Since there will never be pain in the permanent state of death, the only pain this individual avoids is precisely this superficial pain of dying. It cannot be refuted that this anticipation will create some form of mental pain or a "...turmoil in the soul" (131), and therefore the pain created by the anticipation of death is only unnecessary and damaging if it is greater than physical pain. of the momentary act of dying that anticipation allows the individual to avoid. Even if.