I will now examine Nagel's two possible positions on the subject and attempt to answer the question. Regarding (1), we can view death as bad because even life has value when separated from the good or bad experiences it contains. The mere experience of life is valuable in itself, and death is the end of it. Furthermore, the value of life is not only attached to organic survival, surviving in a coma does not appeal to us. Nagel explains that the good in life can be multiplied by time, more is better. Concerning (2), the state of being "dead" or non-existent is itself bad and therefore cannot be what makes death bad. As death is not an evil which accumulates more evil the longer one dies, we would not regard a temporary suspension of life as a great misfortune, nor would we regard it as such the long period of time preceding our birth. If it is true that death is evil because it stops the continuation of life, then we must understand that this is not an intrinsic characteristic of death, but a relational characteristic. This is Nagel's view of death, according to which death is relationally bad, just as in relation to the continuation of life, death is bad.