The categorical imperative applied to a false promise In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks to establish the supreme principle of morality (Kant. 392), the categorical imperative, to serve as a standard by which actions can be evaluated for their moral value. Kant believes that actions motivated by personal experience, whether through observation, indoctrination, or any other ability, lack moral value because such actions are not determined by the conception of moral law. When empirical considerations such as effects, habits, consequences, or material objects shape, modify, and manipulate the will and thus provide the basis for forming an individual's decisions, moral problems abound. Empirical knowledge, education, cultural tradition, desire, purpose, and consequences prevent moral action because they give rise to inconsistencies, biases, and inclinations to influence the will of the individual. Therefore, Kant believes that morality must be separated from conceptions that develop a posteriori, through or after human experience and that moral action must be based on the unalterable element of pure reason. As pure reason and respect for moral law direct moral action by influencing will and conception of duty, the separation of morality from aspects of human experience allows individuals to form maxims that enable their actions to be legitimately willed in universal law, which Kant believes. is necessary to determine the moral content of actions. Kant's sa priori theory of morality addresses the potential problems or contradictions that may arise from the universalization of a maxim (i.e., a false promise) when he constructs formulations of his categorical imperative requiring l 'universality in the formation of moral law, retaining the autonomy of the will and treating individuals as individuals. ends in itself. Therefore, making false promises is contrary to the categorical imperative because the universal fulfillment of false promises would be impossible because if everyone did not keep their promises, the institution of promising would collapse, no one would believe the promises nor would not accept contracts that were known to be broken (442). .Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why violent video games should not be banned”?Get an original essayThe importance of universal law in determining the moral value of an action is evident when making a false promise; a man in need finds himself forced to borrow money. He knows he can't pay it back, but promises to do it anyway. His maxim or moral principle of action is: "When I think I need money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, even if I know I cannot." What would it be like if this law were universal? This law of false promises destroys the whole concept of promises, since no one would believe anyone. It is therefore immoral, because it cannot be rationally universalized. And in fact, reason creates an ideal statement of subjective action. The moral imperative is unconditional; that is to say, its imperative force is not tempered by the conditional “if I want to achieve a goal, then do X”. He simply says: X. Kant believes that reason dictates a categorical imperative in matters of moral action. He gives at least three formulations of the categorical imperative: a) “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. » (422); b) "Act as if the maxim of your action was through your desire to become auniversal law of nature." (Ibid.); c) Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, always as an end and never as a means only" (429 Moreover, when we apply the criterion of universality to this maxim, it becomes clear that if everyone acted in this way, the institution of the promise itself would be undermined so that the principle of an action would be undermined. applied uniformly in this and other cases, it must exist independently of the conditions, restrictions or subjectivity of a particular will or circumstance. External influences and internal prejudices outside the realm of pure reason vary. in each individual and therefore cannot serve as a maxim of action if universal adherence and relevance are desired. Moral value cannot exist in an action that applies to a specific condition because it leads to the formation of. hypothetical imperatives, of a posteriori principles and subject to contingencies. Certain aspects of human experience can make morality subjective and unique to each individual if empirical knowledge and experience directs the formation of moral principles. Using an assortment of personal experiences and a priori knowledge to guide moral action, each individual arrives at a course of action best suited to their interests but which is not universally applicable. Moreover, empirical principles cannot serve as the basis for moral laws, for if the basis of universality by which they should be valid for all rational beings without distinction arises from a particular tendency of human nature or circumstances accidental in which she loves, that universality is lost (442). Thus, the use of empirical knowledge and experience interferes with the establishment of a moral law to which individuals can turn for guidance in action, because it neither establishes a conception of morality nor provides a method of assessing moral worth. Kant's formula of autonomy addresses moral problems, such as moral promise, that can arise when action is guided by a will constrained by influence, empirical knowledge or experience, and lacks governance by pure experience. Kant explains that individuals must act in such a way that [their] will can at the same time consider itself as making universal law through its maxim (431). Individuals being rational beings have the will or ability to act according to principles. This right to autonomy of will is the essence of humanity (430) and of rationality, and must be free to determine one's action on its own bases through the use of pure reason. When empirical knowledge is not separated from motivation for decision and action, pure reason, the element of the mind uninfluenced by the empirical, is incapable of fully directing the will. Because Kant recognizes that experience corrupts objectivity and obscures the function of pure reason, he explains that if the will goes out and seeks law in the property of one of its objects, heteronomy always results. For then the will does not give itself the law, but the object, through its relation to the will, gives it the law (441). By eliminating a posteriori reasoning when acting, the individual can avoid inconsistency in action and heteronomy of will, the imposition of laws from the outside. Therefore, Kant believes that the autonomy of the will to determine action and act in accordance with universal law justifies the It is necessary to eliminate from the decision-making process the corruptibility and immorality that can arise from preconceived notions and empirical studies of morality and law. Furthermore, the designs of the. -