We perceive the world as colorful: but there are no colors in the world. That we perceive the world as colorful is considered trivial, which is why in this essay I will focus primarily on this last statement, "there are no colors in the world." Two philosophical positions are compatible with this statement. The first is an error theory known as eliminativism and the second is subjectivism. There are two reasons people give for saying that there are no colors in the world. The first is that science has not demonstrated that such things exist in the world – this reason is compatible with both views above; the second is that colors are essentially an optical illusion, caused by a systematic error in the visual processing system - this reason is mainly put forward by eliminativists. I will now turn to an analysis of these reasons to see if they are sufficient to draw the conclusion that “there are no colors in the world”. Because the first of these reasons supports both theories, we'll start there, but first I would like to clarify some terminology so as not to confuse the concepts we are talking about. First, this essay is not about the dualistic theory of mind; in a certain sense the subjectivist we are talking about believes that the mind is part of the world, and he is a realist in the sense that he thinks that there is an external world. And secondly, because of the above, some people might think that subjectivism contradicts itself, because if the mind exists in the world and the subjectivist believes that colors are in the mind, then he believes that colors exist in the world. . but the subjectivist is trying to say something more subtle, the subjectivist is trying to say that I...... middle of paper ......, this shows that the eliminativist still needs to find a plausible theory for this which is testable. if this can offer a solution to these problems, then I think they have a strong argument for stating that colors do not exist in the world, but for the reason given above, I find this philosophical position implausible and therefore not yet convincing. In conclusion. I think the subjectivist is too quick to suggest that colors do not exist in the world: despite all the negative consequences, we still cannot pretend that there are no colors in the world, all that we can say is that we don't know. . The eliminativist theory, on the other hand, although it has the advantage that, if true, one could certainly conclude that colors do not exist in the world, seems implausible because it does not respond to what Logue (2013, p5 and p16) calls for the desire for ecumenism.