Friedrich Nietzsche's work, On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life, reads like a polemic against German historicism, the dominant attitude of his time toward the value of history. . Originally published as the second in a series of four Untimely Meditations, this work offers a cultural critique in tension with what Nietzsche saw as the dominant self-satisfied spirit of an era paralyzed by its quest for a certain type of knowledge and truth. From the failure of reason's promise to provide knowledge, the 19th century emerged with a view of historical knowledge as valuable in its own right. Nietzsche's criticism of the 19th century approach to history stems from his belief that an objective, scientific approach to history is psychologically and ethically devastating for contemporary men. It opposes the metaphysical claims of historicism, thus defined, because of its tendency to distance existing individuals from themselves. Echoing Kierkegaard's characterization of objective truth as unsuitable for existing individuals – devaluing such an all-encompassing picture of reality as “a system – for God; but [not] for any existing mind” – Nietzsche diagnoses the destructive effects of such an approach. Like religion, historicism places faith in something outside of ourselves and in the here and now. Nietzsche accuses his contemporaries of having fallen into an indoctrinated approach to history, passive and retrospective, unrelated to the real state of things. Such an approach to history as the science of what is or has been gives us no creative power to determine what we should do. Thus, On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life offers alternative ways of orienting ourselves to history that will contribute to the health and capacity of society to be great. Nietzsche argues for an understanding of the past from a conscious perspective, grounded in contemporary existence and serving the interests of life. The fundamental principle of life, that we exist, must motivate all quests for knowledge and serve the existing individual in his quest to overcome the alienation of historicism's fixation on the past. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”?Get the original essayNietzsche diagnoses the historical disease present in his time as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, which, in its passive retrospection, shatters man's ability to live in the present. He accuses his contemporaries of having erred in their search for truth by placing their quest for knowledge above their nature as existing individuals. Arguing for the primacy of the fact of our existence, Nietzsche asks “which of these two authorities [life or knowledge] is the higher and more decisive? No one will doubt it: life is superior, the governing authority, because any knowledge that destroys life would also have been destroyed” (ADHL, p. 65). It is the primacy of our particular existence that has fallen prey to the retrograde orientation of historicism. While, according to Nietzsche, knowledge can only be legitimately sought in the service of the affirmation of life, modern man seems sick of the effects of excessive indulgence towards the historical past: "From now on, life is no longer the sole ruler and mistress of the world's knowledge. past: on the contrary, all the boundaries are overturned and everything that once existed rushes towards man” (ADHL, p. 23). Living our lives in service of the pastleads people to lose their footing in the present. In seeking objective truths in the past, modern man drags "with him an immense quantity of indigestible stones of knowledge... knowledge which, taken in excess without hunger, even contrary to need, no longer acts as a transformative motive pushing to action…” (ADHL, p. Suffering from a sort of intellectual paralysis, modern culture is “no real culture, but only a kind of culture.” knowledge about culture” (ADHL, p. 24 ).This is due to its reliance on a false ideal of objectivity, the end of historical knowledge pursued for its own sake. Behind a veil of universality, historicism hides a dogmatic relationship with practice. history which prevents even historians themselves from subjecting their discipline to historical examination Nietzsche believes that the practice of history as a science and its demand for an impossible ideal of objectivity, only serves to conceal the facts. prejudices and the particular presuppositions that a historian has due to his existence in historical time and space. In their obsession with the past, his 19th-century contemporaries lost sight of their own historical nature. Each existing individual is a link in the chain of historical existence, and “as far and as fast as he runs, the chain runs with him” (ADHL, p. 8). We each exist as a product of a particular and unique history, which gives rise to our own subjectivity and our own concerns as human beings. The search for objectivity is therefore fundamentally erroneous, an “erroneous article of faith” from which truth emerges “as the weakest of knowledge” (GS, §110). This knowledge is “weak” precisely because its truth is independent of any real concern for our lives. It is useless and misleading to carry out an investigation, like that of historicism, which seeks to go beyond this state of affairs. Such inquiry results in a "solitary knowledge", devoid of "that higher unity in the nature and soul of a people" because the knowledge which these people hold dear is alienated from their very essence (ADHL, p. 27). Nietzsche states that the cure for the "historical disease" is to apply the method of historical inquiry into the past to the existing state of things. In the midst of objectively valid knowledge, the individual “becomes timid and uncertain and may no longer believe in himself: he sinks into himself, into his inner being, which here only means: into chaos cluttered with knowledge that has no meaning.” external effect, of a teaching which does not become life” (ADHL, p. 29). Surrounded by knowledge unrelated to his being, the individual always possesses the tools to save himself, to reaffirm his existence with the same tools he is accustomed to using to dissect the historical past. Indeed, the present is always a historical moment, even if it stands before us: we, existing individuals, remain historical beings. If we apply the “origin of historical education,” which leads us to place so much trust in knowledge extracted from past times, Nietzsche believes we could overcome the greedy modern mind (ADHL, p. 45). The same spirit which led historicists to place such value on the past can be applied to the present situation: thus "the origin of historical education... must itself be understood historically, history must itself dissolve the problem of history” (ADHL, p. 45). Without this deliberate reaffirmation of an inquiry into the present, 19th-century individuals "must always be, in all higher cultural matters, only 'descendants,' for that is all we can be" (ADHL, p 45). As historical beings – that is, people who.., 1974.