IntroductionIn this article I will argue that Russell's sentence analyzes are successful and that the objection raised by Strawson can be refuted. Russell's theory of definite descriptions contains significant insight in that Russell's view that what appear to be referential propositions are in fact quantificational is correct. Russell's theory of definite descriptionsRussell proposes two theses, one on names and the other on definite descriptions. This article discusses Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, "the F", and his theory of their proper logical analysis. Definite descriptions are complex quantifying sentences to be analyzed as follows: The F is G, which has the logical form ∃x(Fx & ∀y(Fy → x=y) & Gx). Russell's philosophical goal was to highlight superficial similarities in sentences and reveal the underlying logical structure of natural language sentences, thereby eliminating the ambiguity or vagueness found in language. The core of Russell's theory of descriptions is that definite descriptions, "So-and-so", are not singular terms (which derive their semantic value from the object), and therefore do not refer to an object singular. Russell argues that this shows that surface shape does not reveal logical structure and he adopts a non-referential interpretation. Russell argues that definite descriptions are general terms and that expressions therefore refer to objects which satisfy a general condition. The distinctions Russell draws between different logical forms allowed him to explain three important puzzles about names and definite descriptions: empty names, substitution in belief contexts, and the informativeness of identity statements. This article will only show how Russell's analysis solves the problems middle of paper...... analyzed retains its meaning. However, there are a number of objections to Russell that are not addressed in this article and it seems that overall judgments of truth and value are a topic still open to debate. ReferencesDonnellan, Keith S. (July 1966). "Reference and definitive descriptions". The Philosophical Review (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 75, No. 3) 75 (3): 281-304. doi:10.2307/2183143. JSTOR 2183143Ludlow, Peter, "Descriptions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .Russell, Bertrand. “On the Denotation” of the Mind, New Series, Vol. 14, no. 56. (October 1905), pp. 479-493.Russell, Bertrand, 'Descriptions' AW Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference, OUP 1993)Strawson, PF 'On Referring', Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 235. (July 1950), pp.. 320-344