In the case of Foakes v. Beer (1884), Beer obtained a judgment against Foakes for a debt and costs in 1875. Over a year later the parties entered into an agreement to the effect that in return for Foakes' payment to Beer of $500 in partial settlement of the judgment debt and provided the balance be paid in installments, Beer would not pursue judgment. In 1882, Beer initiated proceedings to enforce the judgment to recover interest on the judgment debt. It was accepted that the entire debt had now been repaid. The agreement could only be executed for consideration. The only gift in return was the payment of $500 – part of a larger debt already owed. The payment of the installments could only constitute consideration if the payment of $500 constituted consideration. Partial payment of a debt at or after the debt maturity period is not good consideration for the creditors' promise not to demand the balance. Pursuant to Article 64 of the Contract Law, the promisor may renounce or suspend the performance of his promise. Any promisor may renounce in whole or in part, the execution of the promise being made to him. He may instead accept whatever satisfaction he deems appropriate. Illustrations (b) – A owes B RM5000. A paid RM2,000 to B at that time, B accepts in settlement of the entire debt for which the RM5,000 was payable. The entire debt is discharged. In Kerpa Singh v Bariam Singh [1966] 1 MLJ 38, the appellant received a judgment against the defendant for RM8,650. The respondent's son offered to pay RM4,000 as payment to completely release his father from any liability. The check was cashed and the money retained by the appellant's solicitors. Later, the appellant is on the verge of bankruptcy, and... middle of paper ...... and an annual rent of RM40,000 from his dance school which Andy can rent for as long as he wishes. Andy agreed. This is similar to Karuppan Chetty v Suah Thian, the court will find that the requirement of certainty was not met and based on section 30 the agreement becomes void. Two weeks before Nina left for New York, the director of Lily Ballet School agreed to lease Nina's dance school for an annual rent of Rm100,000 for five years. Since the agreement between Nina and Andy is void, Nina can therefore make an agreement with the director of the Lily ballet school. Conclusion In conclusion, although there is a valid offer and valid acceptance between Nina and Andy, the agreement is void due to uncertainty as to whereabouts under section 30 of the Contract Act, 1950. Thus, the agreement between Nina and Andy is void; Nina can make a deal with the director of the ballet school Lily.