Inferring from the tram dilemma and the footbridge dilemma, we can observe an ingrained propensity in people to exhibit an aversion to evil. People usually say that they don't want to hurt others. However, countless acts of violence throughout history have shown us that there is a disparity between what we say and what we actually do. This essay will summarize and discuss the implications of a study conducted by FeldmanHall and colleagues (2012) on this issue. The questions this study seeks to address are how and why behaviors following hypothetical moral scenarios differ from those in actual moral scenarios. Study 1a involved conducting a survey asking 53 participants whether they thought future participants would be more or less likely to avoid harming others for safety reasons. significant personal gain (e.g., monetary incentives) if the stakes were real versus hypothetical. A significant 74% of participants believed that harm aversion would exert greater influence in real-world conditions. Study 1b examined whether the above views would be implemented under experimental conditions. Contrary to the results of Study 1a, the experimenters hypothesized that when motivational forces are real, the incentive for personal gain would become more compelling than the aversion to harm. To test the hypothesis, two experimental conditions were formulated. In the Real PvG condition, participants performed a Pain vs. Gain (PvG) task. In this task, participants were first given $20. Participants participated in 20 trials, in which they could pay up to $1 per trial to reduce the intensity of shocks ($0 for full shock, $1 for no shock) delivered to a receiver, qu 'they thought they were another participant, but who was actually another participant. confederate. The shocks were simulated, but many measurements...... middle of paper ......extremely important study.Works CitedFeldmanHall, O., Mobbs, D., Evans, D., Hiscox, L., Navrady, L. and Dalgleish, T. (2012). What we say and what we do: The relationship between real and hypothetical moral choices. Cognition, 123(3), 434-441. FeldmanHall, O., Dalgleish, T., Thompson, R., Evans, D., Schweizer, S., & Mobbs, D. (2012). Differential neural circuits and self-interest in real and hypothetical moral decisions. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(7), 743-751. Pastötter, B., Gleixner, S., Neuhauser, T. and Bäuml, KHT (2013). To push or not to push? Affective influences on moral judgment depend on the decision-making framework. Cognition, 126(3), 373-377. Patil, I., Cogoni, C., Zangrando, N., Chittaro, L. and Silani, G. (2014). Affective basis of judgment-behavior discrepancy in virtual experiences of moral dilemmas. Social neuroscience,9(1), 94-107.