IntroductionThe purpose of this article is to examine one of the largest offshore oil spills in U.S. history, the Deepwater explosion BP horizon in 2010. This article seeks to take a close look at the system. and the reasons for the failure, to answer the questions hidden behind numerous studies on this accident, Is the Deepwater Horizon explosion inevitable? and What can we do to avoid such accidents?Within the framework of Perrow's normal theory of accidents, this article aims to draw conclusions on the above questions and make recommendations for consideration in further similar oil drilling systems.Case BackgroundOn April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, operated by BP, exploded, costing the lives of eleven people and injuring 17 others. The fire continued for 36 hours until the platform sank. After the sinking, a gusher of oil on the sea floor flowed for 87 days, causing a spill of national significance (BP, 2010). Numerous investigations have explored the causes of the record explosion and spill. Reports, including those from the US government, have cited faulty cement at the well, primarily attributable to BP, but also to rig operator Transocean and contractor Halliburton (BP, 2010; Hogue, 2010). In 2011, a White House commission blamed BP and its partners for a series of cost-cutting decisions and an insufficient safety system, but also concluded that the spill resulted from "systemic" root causes and failure to create and apply both industry practices and government policies (Broder, 2011). So far, BP is still dealing with the fallout. Legal proceedings regarding this matter are ongoing, with settlements and payments having cost BP over $40 billion (Fontevecchia, 2013). Literature review The BP accident will be examined by Perrow (1984)'...... middle of article... ...cy; thus accidents can be better controlled.ConclusionBy evaluating BP's attributes before the accident, the paper shows that the system controlling Deepwater Horizon was a normal accident. Many factors indicate that the complexity and tight coupling found in the BP system may be prevalent in other systems, increasing the likelihood that an accident will worsen not only at Deepwater Horizon, but also in the future . The document recommends that in order to prevent such an accident from happening, every party must get involved. Designers, developers, operators and, most importantly, regulators must know and understand that the potential risks are real and know how to behave accordingly. In conclusion, since accidents in the oil drilling industry are most likely inevitable, there should be regulations to keep all parties together. working towards a goal of operating without failure.